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Trends
We view object recognition as a
dynamic process of transformation
from low-level visual analyses through
superordinate category to basic-level
conceptual representations.
Understanding this process is facili-
tated by using semantic cognitive mod-
els that can capture feature-based
statistical regularities between con-
cepts, providing both superordinate
category and basic-level information.
We highlight research using fMRI,
MEG, and neuropsychological and
behavioural testing to show how fea-Opinion
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(L.K. Tyler).Flexible Access to Conceptual Representations
How do we understand what we see? We interpret this fundamental question as asking how
visual inputs are transformed into conceptual representations. Our conceptual knowledge (see
Glossary) reﬂects what we know about the world, such as learned facts, and the meanings of
both abstract (e.g., freedom) and concrete (e.g., tiger) concepts. Our focus here is on concrete
concepts. When conceptual knowledge is accessed, the information retrieved needs to be
behaviourally relevant. Acting appropriately requires ﬂexible access to different types of con-
ceptual information. Depending on perceptual context and behavioural goals, objects are
recognised in different ways, for example, as a cow, an animal, or living thing. The way objects
are naturally recognised is by accessing information speciﬁc enough to differentiate them from
similar objects (e.g., recognising an object as a cow rather than a horse or a buffalo) – a notion
termed the basic or entry-level of representation [1,2]. However, part of understanding the
meaning of an object also necessitates that more-general information is accessed – for example,
the commonalities between similar objects that enable us to know that an object is part of a
superordinate category (e.g., as an animal or living thing). To understand the cortical under-
pinnings of this ﬂexible access to different aspects of conceptual representations, we need to
specify the neurocomputational processes underlying meaningful object recognition. This in turn
requires that conceptual representations are studied as the expression of a set of dynamic
processes of transformation – from the visual input and different stages of visual processing in
the brain, through different types of categorical organisation, to a basic-level conceptual
representation.
Object recognition has generally not been conceptualised in these terms. It is a domain of
research that straddles many different subdisciplines – most saliently vision science andTrends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2015, Vol. 19, No. 11 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.008 677
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Glossary
Basic-level concept: we can
categorise the same object in many
different ways ranging from more to
less speciﬁc. Examples of the basic-
level category are ‘dog’, ‘chair’,
‘hammer’, rather than more-speciﬁc
(subordinate level; e.g., poodle) or
less-speciﬁc (superordinate level; e.g.,
animal) names. The basic-level
category of an object is typically the
name you would give if asked the
question – can you name this object?
Conceptual knowledge: the
information we know about things in
the world. We use the term
conceptual interchangeably with
semantic. In contrast to episodic
memory, our conceptual knowledge
is not tied to any particular place or
time; for example, it reﬂects our
knowledge about tigers, rather than
our memory of encountering a
speciﬁc tiger in a speciﬁc context.
Conceptual structure statistics:
measures based on the regularities
and co-occurrences of semantic
feature information across different
concepts, where the semantic
features are typically obtained from
large databases (e.g., large norming
studies, corpus data). For example,
‘feature sharedness’, or how
common a feature is across different
concepts, may be calculated as 1/
{the number of concepts a speciﬁc
feature occurs in}. The mean
‘sharedness’ of a concept is then the
mean ‘feature sharedness’ over all
features in the concept. These
statistics can be used to estimate the
statistical structure of individualsemantic memory – but these different strands tend to remain fragmented owing to the
complexity and depth of individual areas. A central theme in vision science is to develop
computational accounts of the ventral visual pathway, based on visual image properties, which
try to explain non-human primate and human brain data (e.g., [3–6]). However, these models are
unable to capture the relationships between different concepts – that an apple and a banana are
more related than an apple and a ball (which are more visually similar). Further, models of vision
alone cannot account for properties such as conceptual priming and ﬂexible access to different
aspects of meaning.
Research in semantic memory, by contrast, focuses on the organisation of semantic knowledge
in the brain resulting in a variety of accounts drawing upon neuropsychology, functional
neuroimaging, computational modelling, and behavioural paradigms. Providing a review of
these perspectives is beyond the scope of this article, and many excellent contemporary
reviews are available [7–14]. Our focus here is on understanding the neural processes that
underpin how meaning is accessed from vision. We describe a neurocognitive model that
integrates (i) a cognitive account of meaning based on the statistical regularities between
semantic features (e.g., ‘has 4 legs’, ‘has a mane’, ‘is black and white’) that can explain a
range of semantic effects, with (ii) the neurocomputational properties of the hierarchically
organised ventral visual pathway.
Basic-Level Concepts and their Superordinate Categories
Most cognitive models of object meaning address semantics through one of two approaches –
focusing on superordinate category organisation (e.g., [9,15]) or basic-level concepts (e.g.,
[16]). However, a comprehensive account needs to consider both these facets.
Research into the organisation of semantic knowledge in the brain has been largely motivated by
the observation of semantic deﬁcits resulting from brain damage and disease – most strikingly
those deﬁcits that seemed to be speciﬁc to only some superordinate categories. Such category-
speciﬁc deﬁcits after neurological diseases such as herpes simplex viral encephalitis (HSVE) have
shown that tissue loss in anteromedial temporal cortex (AMTC; Figure 1) can disproportionately
impair knowledge for living things, with relative preservation of knowledge for nonliving things
[17,18]. Complementing these neuropsychological data, functional imaging and electrophysiol-
ogy studies of healthy individuals show increased activity in the AMTC for living things versus
nonliving things [19–23].concepts and the relationship of
concepts to each other, and have
been shown to inﬂuence how
conceptual information is accessed.
Semantic features: Many models of
conceptual knowledge assume that
meaning is componential in that the
meaning of a concept can be
characterised by many smaller units
of meaning. Semantic features, such
as ‘has legs’ or ‘is round’, are one
such approximation of those units
and can be derived from property
norming studies. Although semantic
features are not claimed to be the
neural units of meaning, the
regularities and statistics derived from
them are predicted to share some
properties with how meaning is
instantiated in the brain.
Superordinate category: refers to
groups made up of many concepts,
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Figure 1. Regions Supporting Conceptual Processing in the Anterior and Posterior Ventral Visual Pathway.
Different subregions of the anterior temporal lobe are shown where the middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and inferior temporal
gyrus (ITG) are relatively more lateral, the fusiform occupies a ventral position, and the perirhinal (PRC) and entorhinal cortex
(ERC) are more medial in the anterior medial temporal cortex (reprinted from [43]).
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where the grouping is based on
semantic properties shared over the
group. Superordinate categories can
range from more speciﬁc categories
such as animals, plants, and tools, to
less speciﬁc categories such as
nonliving things (artifacts).
Living thingsNonliving things(A) (B)
Figure 2. The Nature of Category-Speciﬁc Deﬁcits. (A) Drawings from patient SE of common objects of living and
nonliving things, showing a clear absence of distinctive feature information for living things and a preservation of details for
nonliving things. Nonliving objects, top left to bottom right; helicopter, chisel, anchor, windmill, bus. Living objects; crocodile,
zebra, duck, penguin, camel. Reproduced from [17] with permission from Taylor and Francis. (B) MRI scan from patient SE
showing extensive damage in the right anterior temporal lobe (ATL; image shown in radiological convention, previously
unpublished).By studying patients showing category-speciﬁc deﬁcits following AMTC atrophy, we can gain
important insights into the nature of the information that is lost. A striking illustration of this comes
from patient drawings, where they are asked to sketch a range of living and non-living objects
from memory. In the examples in Figure 2A, all the nonliving objects are well-drawn and easily
identiﬁable, while the drawings of animals mostly reﬂect their shared properties (e.g., four legs, a
tail, eyes, horizontal body), making it impossible to identify them as basic-level concepts. It is
clear from these examples that the informational loss underpinning the impairments of such
patients involves accessing the distinctive properties of living things, rather than a loss of all
information (see [17]). This type of perspective suggests that a more nuanced view of category-
speciﬁcity in the AMTC is needed, one that takes into account the nature of the deﬁcits at a more
speciﬁc level than superordinate categories.
Functional brain imaging studies of healthy individuals have provided key evidence that apparent
superordinate category effects are not restricted to the AMTC. In the posterior fusiform gyrus
(Figure 1), animal images have been shown to produce enhanced effects in the lateral posterior
fusiform gyrus, and tool images show effects in the medial posterior fusiform gyrus [15,24]. The
nature of this lateral-to-medial gradient in the posterior fusiform is especially intriguing given the
range of parameters that produce similar distinctions – such as real world object size [25],
animacy [26], expertise [27], and retinotopy [28], suggesting that highly complex representations
in this region encompass multiple types of stimulus properties [29,30].
The effects animals and tools have on the posterior fusiform is one of a range of category-speciﬁc
effects that have been observed in the temporal and parietal lobes for different categories –
animals in the lateral fusiform, superior temporal sulcus (STS), and amygdala [31,32]; tools in
medial fusiform, middle temporal gyrus (MTG), inferior parietal lobule (IPL) [33]; places in the
lingual, medial fusiform and parahippocampal gyrus [34]; faces in the lateral occipital, lateral
fusiform, STS [35,36]; bodies in the lateral fusiform and STS [37]. While understanding the
organisation of different categories remains a central issue for cognitive neuroscience, we focusTrends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2015, Vol. 19, No. 11 679
here on one aspect of this, category effects of animals and tools in the posterior fusiform, to
illustrate the insights and advances we can make by studying part of this system in detail.
The effects of superordinate category in the AMTC and posterior fusiform must reﬂect comple-
mentary, but different, aspects of semantic computations, but research focusing on superordi-
nate categories has been insufﬁcient to resolve the complementary roles these regions might
play.
A largely separate strand of research has focused on basic-level conceptual entities and centres
on the anterior temporal lobe (ATL, often deﬁned as the anteroventral and anterolateral aspects
of the temporal lobe) which is claimed to represent amodal conceptual information [11,38]. This
idea draws upon the notion of convergence zones in the ATL, which acts to bring together
information from other brain regions to represent concepts [38–40]. Widespread damage to the
ATL is associated with semantic deﬁcits at the level of basic-level concepts for all categories,
while superordinate category knowledge itself is unimpaired. Thus, damage to the ATL and to
the AMTC seem to have very different effects on conceptual knowledge which have yet to be
fully explained.
While these lines of research have fundamentally enhanced our understanding of the neural
basis of conceptual knowledge, two signiﬁcant issues arise. First, theories that focus on the
organisation of superordinate category information alone ignore what is perhaps the most salient
aspect of semantics – the information which differentiates between basic-level concepts –
because it is these concepts that are claimed to be the most necessary in daily usage [2].
Consequently, we believe that concepts, not categories, should be the focus of research.
Second, research focusing on basic-level concepts has little to say about superordinate
category representations. As a consequence, research into superordinate category represen-
tations and basic-level concepts is rarely integrated to provide an account of how meaning is
accessed from vision.
Conceptual Structure in the Ventral Visual Pathway
A comprehensive cognitive model of conceptual representations in the brain needs to provide an
account of both these sets of issues, and we argue that this can be achieved through the use of
semantic feature models of conceptual knowledge. The model that we adopt here, the
conceptual structure account [12,41], claims that concepts can be represented in terms of
their semantic features (e.g., ‘has legs’, ‘made of metal’) and statistical measures, termed
conceptual structure statistics, based on the regularities of features both across concepts
and within a concept. Conceptual structure statistics can be informative about both the
superordinate category of a concept (e.g., a camel is an animal and a mammal) and how
distinctive a concept is within the category (e.g., a camel is distinctive because of its hump which
no other animals have). As Box 1 explains, category membership is strongly indicated by the
features a concept shares with many other concepts (e.g., many animals have fur, and have legs
etc.), while the relationship between the shared and the distinctive features of a concept reﬂects
the ease with which a concept can be differentiated from similar concepts (or conceptual
individuation). Further, statistics derived from property norms can reveal systematic differences
between categories, such that living things (e.g., animals) have many shared and few distinctive
features (all animals have eyes, but few have a hump), whereas nonliving things (e.g., tools) have
fewer shared and relatively more distinctive features. The information captured with conceptual
structure statistics shows how feature-based models can provide a single theoretical framework
that captures information about conceptual representations at different levels of description.
Recent fMRI data from healthy participants [42] and lesion behaviour mapping in brain-damaged
patients [43] show how conceptual structure statistics – capturing either superordinate category680 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2015, Vol. 19, No. 11
Box 1. Conceptual Structure Statistics
Many cognitive models of semantics rest on the assumption that meaning is componential in nature, in that a concept is
composed of smaller elements of meaning, such as semantic features [12,82–87]. Semantic features derived from large-
scale property norming studies [88] have proven to be a useful way of estimating the underlying structure and content of
semantic representations [2,41,89,90]. The statistical regularities derived from semantic features, such as the feature
frequency and the pattern of feature co-occurrence, correlate with behaviour across a variety of tasks [91–93] and with
measures of brain activity [42,49,68,94–98].
Research supporting feature-based models highlights three key feature statistics relating to the ease and speed of
activating concept-level representations:
First, ‘mean sharedness’ captures whether the semantic features of a concept are relatively more shared by many other
concepts (e.g., ‘has ears’) or are more distinctive of the particular concept (e.g., ‘has a hump’). Concepts with many
shared features are semantically related to many other concepts, and having many shared features provides a strong
indication of superordinate category membership. However, having many shared features also results in increased
processing to individuate the concept from their semantic neighbours. A concept that has more distinctive features
typically has fewer semantic neighbours, and this facilitates the activation of a unique conceptual representation. Second,
‘correlational strength’ captures how often the features of a concept co-occur and modulate the ease of conceptual
processing (the features ‘has eyes’, ‘has ears’, and ‘has legs’ are likely to co-occur with each other). Greater correlation
between the features of a concept strengthens the links between them, speeding their coactivation and facilitating
conceptual processing. Finally, the interaction between feature sharedness and correlation (‘correlation  distinctive-
ness’) is thought to play a crucial role in accessing conceptual meaning, such that concepts with highly correlated
distinctive features are more easily identiﬁed, while concepts that combine highly correlated shared features (such as
eyes, ears, legs) and weakly correlated distinctive features (the stripes of a tiger) require additional differentiation
processes.
These measures have differential effects depending on the nature of the behavioural goals [93]. During superordinate
categorisation (e.g., is an object living or man-made), recognition is facilitated for concepts with many shared features, as
well as for concepts whose shared features are more highly correlated. By contrast, during unique conceptual
identiﬁcation (e.g., naming an object as a tiger), recognition is facilitated for concepts with fewer shared features
and for concepts whose shared features are more weakly correlated. These contrasting inﬂuences of conceptual
structure statistics on behaviour reveal how different forms of conceptual information are differentially relevant depending
on behavioural goals.information or the ease of conceptual individuation – differentially relate to regions along the
ventral visual pathway. In one study [42], we calculated conceptual structure statistics for a large
and diverse set of common objects that participants named during fMRI scanning. We then
related brain activation across these objects to different conceptual measures to determine how
conceptual structure statistics inﬂuence object processing (Figure 3A). The results show that the
conceptual structure of an object affects processing at two key sites along the ventral visual
pathway. First, there is a gradient effect across the lateral-to-medial posterior fusiform that
reﬂects the mean feature sharedness of a concept. Objects with many shared features (typically
animals) show greater effects in the lateral posterior fusiform gyrus, and objects with fewer
shared features (typically tools) show greater effects in the medial posterior fusiform gyrus.
Second, effects in the AMTC, speciﬁcally in perirhinal cortex (PRC), are related to the ease of
conceptual individuation: more-confusable concepts evoke greater activation. Evidence from
lesion–behaviour mapping [43] conﬁrms this relationship between conceptual structure statistics
and the PRC. Damage to the PRC results in an increased deﬁcit for naming semantically more-
confusable objects, where confusability is deﬁned by conceptual structure statistics (‘correlation
 distinctiveness’; Figure 3B). Together, these two studies converge to highlight a speciﬁc
relationship, between a conceptual structure statistic capturing conceptual individuation and the
PRC, that was only indirectly suggested from prior brain lesion-mapping evidence [44–47].
The statistical measures derived from feature-based accounts shed new light on the nature of
category-speciﬁc effects in different regions of the ventral visual pathway, and do so with a
framework situated at the level of basic-level concepts. Lateral-to-medial effects in the posterior
fusiform gyrus, previously associated with category-speciﬁc effects for animals and tools, in fact
seem to reﬂect a gradient of feature sharedness, whereas category-speciﬁc effects for livingTrends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2015, Vol. 19, No. 11 681
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Figure 3. Conceptual Structure Effects In The Ventral Visual Pathway. (A) Conceptual structure statistics modulate
activity in both the posterior and anterior-medial temporal lobe based on different feature-based statistics. Posterior fusiform
activity increases in the lateral posterior fusiform for objects with relatively more shared features, and activity increases in the
medial posterior fusiform for objects with relatively fewer shared features. Bilateral anteromedial temporal cortex (AMTC)
activity increases for concepts that are semantically more-confusable (reproduced from [42] with permission from MIT
press). (B) Increasing damage to the perirhinal cortex (PRC) results in poorer performance for naming semantically more-
confusable objects. This is shown by ﬁrst correlating the naming accuracy of each patient with a conceptual structure
measure for the ease of conceptual individuation. This correlation is then related to the degree of damage to the PRC
(crosses denote left hemisphere damage; circles denote right hemisphere damage) (reprinted from [43]). (C) Pattern
similarity in bilateral PRC is related to conceptual similarity based on semantic features. Semantic similarity can be deﬁned
based on overlapping semantic features between concepts, where concepts both cluster by superordinate category and
show within-category variability. Testing the relationship between semantic feature similarity and pattern similarity in the
brain shows that bilateral PRC similarity patterns also show a clustering by superordinate category and, crucially, within-
category differentiation aligned to conceptual similarity (reprinted from [49] with permission from the Society for Neu-
roscience). (D) The timecourse of superordinate category and basic-level concept information shown with magnetoence-
phalography (MEG). Using multiple linear regression we can learn how to map between the recorded MEG data and the
visual and semantic measures for different objects. After showing how well this model can explain the observed neural data,
we asked how accurately the model could predict MEG data for new objects. This showed than the superordinate category
of an object can be successfully predicted before the prediction of the basic-level concept (after accounting for the inﬂuence
of visual statistics) (reprinted from [68] with permission from Oxford University Press).things in the AMTC can be explained in terms of the ease of conceptual individuation – two
measures derived from a single account to explain category-speciﬁc effects in different regions
of the ventral visual pathway for different computational reasons.
This research points to a key computational role for the human PRC in the individuation of
semantically-confusable concepts. This role is not relevant for all semantic distinctions, but only
for those requiring highly differentiated representations, such as distinctions between a lion,
leopard, and cheetah. This is clear from studies showing increased AMTC activity only during
basic-level conceptual recognition and not during superordinate category distinctions [22,48],
and from studies showing that activity increases in the PRC during the recognition of semanti-
cally more-confusable objects [42,49].
There are close parallels here with research on the resolution of visual ambiguity and confus-
ability in the PRC in both human and non-human primates [50–52], and on conceptual effects in
humans [23,42,46,49,53–60]. Functionally, it can be argued that the PRC serves to differentiate682 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2015, Vol. 19, No. 11
between objects that have many overlapping features, and are therefore nearby in semantic
space, while objects in sparse areas, with few semantic competitors, require less involvement of
the PRC. This is directly supported by research showing that activation patterns in the human
PRC reﬂect the semantic similarity of concepts, as deﬁned by semantic features (Figure 3C)
[49,55].
This computational role of the PRC helps to explain two phenomena from neuropsychology.
First, patients who present category-speciﬁc deﬁcits for living things following AMTC damage
show intact superordinate category knowledge. The basic-level nature of the deﬁcits can be
explained in terms of the role of the PRC being predominantly limited to differentiating between
entities within superordinate categories. However, not all categories are equally effected follow-
ing AMTC damage, leading to the second phenomenon: that the observed category-speciﬁc
deﬁcits for living things occur as a result of a differentiation impairment within denser areas of
semantic space, more typical for living things, while these patients can easily differentiate within
the less-dense areas typically occupied by nonliving things – resulting in the phenomena seen in
Figure 1A.
These ﬁndings suggest a conceptual hierarchy in the ventral visual pathway, where a network of
regions supports recognition of meaningful objects, and that category-speciﬁc effects emerge in
different regions owing to categorical differences across complementary semantic feature
statistics. This also has the implication that our individual knowledge about objects may reshape
the distribution of effects in the ventral stream, consistent with research showing that expertise
with different categories, and thus an increased ability to individuate between highly-similar
objects, also increasingly engages the lateral posterior fusiform and anterior temporal regions
[27,61] – those regions most important for individuating objects with many shared features and
few distinctive features.
The Temporal Dynamics of Conceptual Processing
We have shown how a semantic feature-based approach can account for observations of
superordinate category-speciﬁc effects at different loci in the ventral visual pathway. Any
comprehensive account of conceptual processing must also be able to capture the temporal
dynamics during the retrieval of semantic knowledge. During object recognition, the system
dynamics follow an initial feedforward phase of processing as signals propagate along
the ventral temporal lobe, followed by recurrent, long-range reverberating interactions
between cortical regions [62–66]. The exact nature of the computations supported by these
dynamics remains unclear, though there is clear evidence that information relevant to
superordinate category distinctions can be accessed very rapidly (within 150 ms [67–69])
whereas speciﬁc conceptual information is only accessible after approximately 200 ms
[59,68,70–72].
How the temporal dynamics map onto the processing of conceptual information is an issue we
have recently begun to investigate [73]. By measuring neural activity with a high temporal
resolution, and using machine-learning methods, we can determine whether feature-based
models can predict patterns of brain activity over time. One magnetoencephalography (MEG)
study along these lines [68] showed that by combining a computational model of visual
processing from V1 to posterior temporal cortex [74] with semantic feature information, the
neural activity for single objects could be well explained and this model could be used to predict
neural activity for other (new) objects. While the model including both visual and semantic
information could successfully account for single-object neural activity from 60 ms, the semantic
feature information made unique contributions over and above those that the visual information
could explain. Semantic feature information explained a signiﬁcant amount of single object data
in the ﬁrst 150 ms, and this in turn could predict neural activity that dissociated between objectsTrends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2015, Vol. 19, No. 11 683
from different superordinate categories. After around 150 ms, the predictions become more
speciﬁc, and differentiated between members of the same category (i.e., the basic-level concept
could be predicted solely based on semantics; Figure 3D).
In a direct assessment of the inﬂuence of conceptual structure statistics on the time-course of
object recognition, a second MEG study [75] demonstrated that MEG signals correlated with the
visual statistics of an object before rapid effects driven by the feature sharedness of the object in
the ﬁrst 150 ms. Subsequent to this, both shared and distinctive features were correlated with
MEG signals after 150 ms. Together, these MEG studies highlight two important time-frames of
conceptual processing during object recognition – early information that (rapidly activated by
visual properties) dissociates superordinate categories and which is driven by shared feature
information, and later conceptual integration of information which individuates basic-level con-
cepts from semantically similar items.
Importance of Anterior–Posterior Interactions in the Ventral Stream
Taken together, data from neuropsychology, fMRI, and MEG reveal that semantic representa-
tions are transformed from primarily reﬂecting superordinate category information to basic-level
conceptual information within a few hundred milliseconds, supported by processing along the
ventral visual pathway. In particular, the posterior fusiform gyrus and PRC are important to this
transition. Electrophysiological recordings in the PRC and posterior ventral temporal cortex of
macaques suggest that visual information becomes more differentiated as information ﬂows
from posterior to anterior regions [76], a general process along the ventral stream in which object
representations are increasingly differentiated [3]. With regards to the mechanism of how basic-
level concepts become differentiated within their category, we have shown that connectivity
between the ATL and the posterior fusiform increases during tasks requiring access to basic-
level concepts compared to those requiring access to superordinate category information [70].
This highlights that the temporal relationship between neural activity in anterior and posterior
temporal lobe regions plays an important role in the formation of detailed basic-level conceptual
representations.
An important issue is whether interactions involving anterior and posterior regions in the ventral
visual pathway are predominantly feedforward or feedback in nature, and how this might change
during the course of perception. Combining neuropsychology and functional imaging is partic-
ularly illuminating. Patients with semantic deﬁcits following neurological diseases affecting the
anterior temporal lobes show reduced functional activity in the posterior aspects of the ventral
stream [77,78], suggesting that anterior damage impacts on the functioning of more-posterior
sites. Consistent with this, small lesions to the temporal pole and rhinal cortices (perirhinal and
entorhinal) create network dysfunction in the ventral visual pathway, speciﬁcally resulting in
reduced feedback connectivity from the anterior temporal lobes to posterior fusiform [79].
Overall, these studies strongly suggest that feedback from the anterior temporal lobes, and
from PRC, to the posterior ventral stream constitutes a necessary mechanism for accessing
speciﬁc conceptual representations.
The role that brain connectivity plays in the organisation and orchestration of conceptual
knowledge in the brain is yet to be fully appreciated [80]. We have emphasised that connectivity
between anterior and posterior temporal lobe sites provides a key underpinning to forming
speciﬁc basic-level conceptual representations [70], but how this within-temporal-lobe connec-
tivity is coordinated with other networks (e.g., frontotemporal connectivity) remains an important
unresolved issue [62,81]. One avenue for progress requires understanding how different brain
networks are coordinated, the oscillatory nature of such connectivity and, vitally, how connec-
tivity is modulated by well-characterised and distinct cognitive processes (see Outstanding
Questions).684 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2015, Vol. 19, No. 11
Outstanding Questions
How does connectivity within, and
beyond, the ventral visual pathway
emerge and dissolve during the recog-
nition of an object? The way in which
regions communicate changes over
time, but we know little about how
the dynamic patterns of connectivity
wax and wane, or what information
they reﬂect.
How does conceptual structure inter-
face with non-visual recognition? The
research discussed here is based on
visual object recognition, where mean-
ing is accessed from vision. However, it
remains to be seen if conceptual struc-
ture can account for activations outside
the ventral stream, such as during tac-Concluding Remarks
We have argued here for a single explanatory framework, based on a feature-based account, to
understand semantic cognition in the ventral visual pathway. This framework can account for
several phenomena, previously unconnected, across behaviour, functional neuroimaging (fMRI,
MEG), and brain-damaged patients. Progress in understanding conceptual representations in
the brain is signiﬁcantly advanced by shifting focus to the representation of basic-level concepts
and to the relationships between them. We can then harness the potential of large feature-
norming datasets to provide well-characterised models of semantic space whose regularities
can be exploited using multivariate analysis methods applied to multiple imaging modalities.
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